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INTRODUCTION
In December 2014, the U.S. Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence (hereinafter SSCI) released an unclassified, but
heavily redacted, report on the Central Intelligence Agency’s
(hereinafter CIA) Interrogation and Detention Program. The
details of the report revealed a concentrated effort by CIA
officials and private contractors to conduct unauthorized and
illegal interrogation tactics on detainees deemed to be of
intelligence value. The report explains in graphic and lurid
detail the enhanced interrogation techniques used by private
military contractors that amount to inhumane forms of torture
and abuse. Under the program, the CIA effectively outsourced
its interrogation program to a private military corporation under
the pseudonym ‘Company Y’ as CIA officials continually shuffled
detainees through different “Black Sites”1 throughout the world
See Jane Mayer, The Black Sites, NEW YORKER, Aug. 13, 2007, at 46;
Sheryl Gay Stolberg, President Moves 14 Held in Secret to Guantanamo, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 7, 2006 (describing “black sites” as secret CIA installations
designed to escape the reach of domestic law).
1
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in order to evade the reach of U.S. law. This analysis seeks to
argue that ‘Company Y’ is responsible for its role in the use of
inhumane and tortious interrogation techniques during the
CIA’s Interrogation and Detention Program under the Alien
Tort Statute. Furthermore, this analysis will seek to reconcile
case law in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Kiobel v.
Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., et. al.2, and subsequent court
decisions opining on the extraterritorial reach of the Alien Tort
Statute. Significantly, this analysis will also answer questions
left open in the Kiobel decision by arguing that corporate
entities, such as Company Y, may be held liable in U.S. courts
for violations of international law. Although the Kiobel decision
strongly indicated that corporate liability may attach under the
Alien Tort Statute (hereinafter ATS) if there is a sufficient nexus
to the United States, the court ultimately left open two questions
of law: (1) whether corporations could be liable for tortious
conduct under the ATS, and, if so, (2) under what circumstances
the ATS could apply to conduct occurring outside the geographic
territory of the United States. Notably, circuit courts disagree as
to whether corporate liability exists under international law,
and, if it does, how to determine whether such liability results
in a colorable ATS claim. Lastly, this analysis will determine the
extent to which a plaintiff could hold Company Y liable for
tortious conduct occurring in territories outside the United
States under the ATS.
I.

OPERATIONAL
DEFINITIONS
AND
THE
INTERNATIONAL PROHIBITION AGAINST TORTURE

A. Defining Customary International Law, The Law of
Nations, and jus cogens Norms
The intersection of jus cogens norms, Customary Practice,
and International Corporate Liability are critical to the issue of
whether a private military corporation can be held liable for a
violation of jus cogens or customary international law under the
ATS. Therefore, in order to fully appreciate the breadth of this
analysis, we must first operationally define some core
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S.Ct. 1659 (2013) [hereinafter
Kiobel II].
2
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international and domestic legal principles. The term jus cogens
references a specific set of international norms that are so
fundamental and integral to international law that a nation may
not violate them under any circumstances. Unlike rules created
by customary practice, a declaration or treaty will not refute the
imposition of the norm upon a state. These norms are not always
codified, but the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
(“VCLT”) specifically acknowledges them. Article 52 of the
VCLT defines jus cogens as “a norm accepted and recognized by
the international community of States as a whole as a norm from
which no derogation is permitted.”3 Examples of these norms
include acts such as “trade in slaves, piracy or genocide . . . [and]
treaties violating human rights.”4 Moreover, jus cogens
violations go beyond individual liability of the perpetrator. The
ILC Draft Articles on The Responsibility of States for Wrongful
Conduct, as well as various international tribunals impute
liability for violations of these norms upon the state itself when
an “organ” of the state is the perpetrator.5 International
Conventions codifying certain jus cogens such as the Torture
Convention and the Genocide Convention both impose liability
of these violations extraterritorially since they are not just
violations of an individual, but violations against the
international community as a whole.6
3
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980), reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969)
and 63 AM. J. INT’L L. 875 (1969) (Although the United States has not ratified
the Vienna Convention, the United States considers many of the treaty’s
provisions as customary international law).
4 Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful
Acts, Commentaries, Chapter III, at n. 641, in Report of the International Law
Commission on the Work of Its Fifty-third Session, U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess.,
Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001); see also id. at art. 40, ¶¶ 4-6 (citing
examples of jus cogens norms as the prohibition of aggressive wars, slavery and
the slave trade, genocide, racial discrimination and apartheid, torture, the
basic rules of international humanitarian law as applied to the law of armed
conflict, and the principle of self-determination).
5 Id. at art. 4(2); see also Military and Paramilitary Activities in and
against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1985 I.C.J. 14 (June 27) [hereinafter
Nicaragua v. United States]; Application of the Convention on the Prevention
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Hertz v. Serb. & Mont.)
(Judgment of Feb. 26, 2007) [hereinafter Bosnia v. Serbia]; Prosecutor v. Tadic,
Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgment, ¶123 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia, July 15, 1999) [hereinafter Prosecutor v. Tadic].
6 Sévrine Knuchel, State Immunity and the Promise of Jus Cogens, 9 NW.
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Customary International Law refers to a regime of
“international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted
as law” which constitutes evidence of a customary rule.7
Although this regime is not codified or considered as so
fundamental and general to be considered a jus cogens norm,
states adhere to these rules as a matter of opinio juris (belief
that the rule or norm is legally binding) or opinio necessitates
(state practice).8 In The Paquete Habana,9 the United States
Supreme Court further defined customary law by holding that it
is the “customs and usages of civilized nations” evidenced by
works of jurists and commentators who have garnered
significant expertise in the subject matter of international law.10
Notably, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) has held that
when such a practice rises to the level of “Customary Practice,”
then it is binding upon all Nation States.11 Although it is difficult
to ascertain a precise definition of what constitutes sufficient
state practice, the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia in Prosecutor v. Tadic, provides guidance by
stating
. . . appraising the formation of customary rules or general
principles one should therefore be aware that, on the account of
the inherent nature of this subject matter, reliance must be
primarily placed on such elements as official pronouncements of
States, military manuals and judicial decisions. 12

These articulations of Customary International Law
emphasize the difficulty in ascertaining a precise definition of at
U. J. INT’L HUM. RTS. 149 ¶¶ 13-15; see also Convention Against Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, arts. 5, 7, Dec.
10, 1984, 1456 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter CAT]; Geneva Convention Relative to
the Treatment of Prisoners of War, arts. 49, 50, 129, 146, Aug. 12, 1949, 6
U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135. In the U.S., the Torture Victim Protection Act
is an example of national legislation providing such form of extraterritorial
jurisdiction (see infra Section IV.B).
7 Mark E. Villiger, Customary International Law and Treaties, 3 (1985).
8 Art. 38(1)(b) I.C.J. Statute, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 1060, T.S. No.
993.
9 The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
10 Id.
11 North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Fed. Rep. of Ger. v. Neth.), 1968
I.C.J., ¶¶ 37-38 (Apr. 26 1968) [hereinafter North Sea Continental Shelf Cases].
12 Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic a/k/a/ “Dule,” Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgment,
¶123 Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia (July 15, 1999).
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what point a practice becomes binding custom.13 However, each
of these definitions parallel a workable approach best
articulated by the Restatement Third which describes
customary law “as resulting from a general and consistent
practice of states followed by them from a sense of legal
obligation.”14 Thus, no precise timetable is set for when a custom
achieves legal status; the Commentaries on the Restatement
contend that a practice can often achieve customary law status
within a short period of time through international acceptance
of its legality.15
B.

International and Domestic Prohibition Against Torture

The actions of Company Y, which with the CIA, include
heinous violations of customary international law. Numerous
reports by public entities and non-governmental organizations
have documented the torture and abuse conducted on detainees
within the CIA’s Interrogation and Detention program.16
Importantly, international condemnation of torture has been
recognized since before the mid-1900’s, and formal prohibition of
torture has been codified as customary international law in
various international tribunals.17 Federal courts recognize the
13 Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States,
§102, 702 (1987) (hereinafter “Restatement”).
14 Restatement § 102(2).
15 Restatement § 102 comment a; see also, North Sea Continental Shelf
(Ger. v. Den., Ger. v. Neth.), Merits, 1969 I.C.J. 3, ¶¶ 71, 73– 74 (Feb. 20).
16 This analysis includes only brief summations of the type of heinous
violations inflicted upon detainees within the CIA’s Interrogation and
Detention program. For a detailed account of these violations see generally,
U.S. Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence, Committee Study of the Central
Intelligence Agency’s Detention and Interrogation Program (S. Rept. 114-8)
Washington, Government Printing Office, 2015 [hereinafter SSCI Report]; see
generally Amnesty International, USA Crimes and Impunity: Full Senate
Committee Report On CIA Secret Detentions Must Be Released, And
Accountability For Crimes Under International Law Ensured, London (Apr.
2015),
http://www.amnestyusa.org/sites/default/files/cia_torture_report_amr_511432
2015.pdf [hereinafter Amnesty Int’l Report].
17 See, e.g., European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, art. 3, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221; American
Convention on Human Rights, art. 5(2), Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123;
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, art. 5, June 27, 1981, OAU
Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5; see also Nicaragua v. United States, 1986 I.C.J. 14,
255; Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic a/k/a/ “Dule,” Case No. IT-94-1-I, Decision on

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol28/iss1/4

6

4 DAVID J SATNARINE (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

8/30/2016 3:53 PM

DESKTOP PUBLISHING EXAMPLE

167

international prohibition against torture and have continually
reinforced its status as customary international law.18 Although
corporations are not liable under the Torture Convention,19
corporations are nevertheless liable under other statutes and
common law remedies for torture, as this analysis will further
develop.20
C. The History of the ATS and its Application in U.S. Courts
In 1789, Congress enacted Section 9 of the First Judiciary
Act. This provision provided, among other things, that federal
jurisdiction shall have “cognizance, concurrent with the courts
of the several States, or the circuit courts, as the case may be, of
all causes of action where an alien sues for a tort only in violation

the Defence Motion on Jurisdiction, 65–74 (Aug. 10, 1995).
18 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732, (2004) (“[F]or purposes of
civil liability, the torturer has become—like the pirate and slave trader before
him—hostis humani generis, an enemy of all mankind”) citing Filartiga v.
Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 878 (2d Cir. 1980) (torture “violates universally
accepted norms of the international law of human rights); Siderman de Blake
v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 716 (9th Cir. 1992) (international
prohibition against torture is undisputed); Restatement (Third) of
the Foreign Relations Law of the United States §102, (1987) (Torture is an
international crime and the prohibition against torture constitutes a jus
cogens norm).
19 See Mohamad v. Palestinian Auth., 132 S. Ct. 1702, 1710 (2012).
20 See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 5, G.A. Res. 217
(III) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR];
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 7, Dec. 16, 1966, S.
Treaty Doc. 95-20 (1978), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR] (ratified by
the United States on June 8, 1992); Convention Against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, art. 2, Dec. 10, 1984,
S. Treaty Doc. 100-20 (1988), 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter CAT] (ratified by
the United States on Oct. 21, 1994); Geneva Convention Relative to the
Treatment of Prisoners of War, arts. 3, 13, 130, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316,
75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter GC III] (ratified by the United States on Aug. 2,
1955); Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in
Time of War, arts. 3, 32, 147, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287
[hereinafter GC IV] (ratified by the United States on Aug. 2, 1955); see also
Romero v. Drummond Co., Inc. 552 F.3d 1303, 1315 (11th Cir. 2008) (finding
that corporations may be liable under the ATS for torture); Mwani v. Al Qaeda,
No. CV 99-125 (JMF), 2014 WL 4749182, at 9 (D.D.C. Sept. 25, 2014) (holding
that ATS jurisdiction is “best read as having been enacted on the
understanding that the common law would provide a cause of action.”
Therefore, federal courts may “recognize private claims [for such violations]
under federal common law”).
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of the law of nations, or a treaty of the United States.”21 While
Congress has modified this provision over time, it is presently
recognized as the Alien Tort Statute (ATS).22 Although there is
little legislative history available for the ATS, its inclusion in the
First Judiciary Act strongly indicates that the fledgling United
States sought to alleviate concerns that it would not be able to
uphold its treaty obligations.23 Prior to the 1980s, the ATS had
been rarely litigated. The first two cases occurred in the late 18th
century and dealt primarily with admiralty cases.24 The statute
was once against invoked in O’Reilly De Camara v. Brooke25
dealing with the U.S. occupation of Cuba, but remained virtually
dormant for almost one hundred years thereafter.
In 1980, the ATS was revived in Filartiga v. Peña-Irala.26
The Filartiga case centered around alleged violations of
international customary law that occurred overseas in the
Republic of Paraguay. The plaintiff alleged that Peña-Irala, the
defendant, kidnapped, tortured, and murdered her brother
while he was serving as Inspector General of the Paraguyan
police force in Paraguay in violation of the law of nations.27 The

Judiciary Act, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 77 (1789); 28 U.S.C. § 1350
See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 115-17 (2d Cir.
2010) [hereinafter Kiobel] (noting that after its passage by the first Congress
in 1789, the ATS laid largely dormant for over 170 years,” and relating the
subsequent interpretation of the ATS by courts), aff’d, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch
Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 185 L. Ed. 2d 671, 81 U.S.L.W. 4241 (2013).
23 Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692); see also Kenneth C. Randall, Federal
Jurisdiction over International Law Claims: Inquiries into the Alien Tort
Statute, 18 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 1, 13 (1985); Thomas B. Harvey, Wrapping
Themselves in the American Flag: The Alien Tort Statute, Private Military
Contractors, and U.S. Foreign Relations, 53 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 247, 262 (2008).
24 See Moxon v. The Fanny, 17 F. Cas. 942 (No. 9, 895) (D.C. Pa. 1793);
Bolchos v. Darrel, 3 F. Cas 810 (D.S.C. 1795) (No. 1607).
25 O’Reilly De Camara v. Brooke, 209 U.S. 45, 51 (1908).
26 Filartiga, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). Minor court decisions dealt with
ATS claims prior to Filartiga, but the Filartiga decision became a key
precedent in the evolution of the ATS. For prior application of the ATS in the
20th century, see Benjamins v. British European Airways, 572 F.2d 913 (2d
Cir. 1978); Huyn Thi Anh v. Levi, 586 F.2d 625 (6th Cir. 1978).
27
Id. at 878-79 (Filartiga alleged that Peña-Irala violated the U. N.
Charter; the Universal Declaration on Human Rights; the U. N. Declaration
Against Torture; the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man;
and other pertinent declarations, documents and practices constituting the
customary international law of human rights and the law of nations.);
Filartiga, 630 F.2d 876, 879 (2d Cir. 1980).
21
22
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Second Circuit concluded that the law of nations was to be
interpreted as a “constantly evolving” body of law rather than a
static sphere of rights.28 Moreover, the court held that ATS did
not create new rights, but rather conferred upon the courts the
right to adjudicate “rights already recognized by international
law.”29 Based upon this analysis, the court concluded that
torture was a violation of the law of nations, and further that the
ATS conferred jurisdiction to examine violations occurring
outside the territory of the United States where there was
personal jurisdiction over the defendants.30 Filartiga launched a
new wave of ATS litigation in U.S. Courts and opened the door
to a new wave of ATS litigation that forced numerous courts to
wrestle with issues of jurisdiction, international treaties, and
violations of jus cogens and customary international law.
In 2004, the United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari to clarify the scope of the ATS.31 The Supreme Court
held that Congress enacted the ATS to be actionable and have a
“practical effect” in federal courts32, and “meant to underwrite
litigation of a narrow set of common law actions derived from the
law of nations.”33 Although the type of violations actionable
under the ATS are limited, “Congress did not pass the ATS as a
jurisdictional convenience to be placed on the shelf for use by a
future Congress or state legislature that might, someday,
authorize the creation of causes of action or itself decide to make
some element of the law of nations actionable for the benefit of
foreigners.”34
D. The Kiobel Complaint and Supreme Court Decisions
The Kiobel decisions heavily influence the outcome of a
potential ATS claim against Company Y. In Kiobel,35 the
plaintiffs filed an ATS suit against Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.,
Shell Transport & Trading Co., Plc, and its wholly owned
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35

Id. at 885.
Id. at 886.
Id.
Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. at 699.
Id. at 719.
Id. at 721.
Id. at 719.
Kiobel, 621 F.3d 111.
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subsidiary Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria
Ltd.36 The plaintiffs alleged that respondents contracted with
the Nigerian government to eliminate opposition to oil fields in
Nigerian villages by extrajudicial killings, unlawful arrest,
torture, and other violations of customary international law. The
petitioners also alleged that the respondents aided and abetted
the Nigerian government in committing these acts by providing
logistical support to the Nigerian military, including food,
transportation, and allow use of respondent’s property in order
for the Nigerian military to stage their attacks. The Second
Circuit held that since customary international law determines
the scope of liability under the ATS,37 the court must also
examine whether civil liability against corporations existed as
customary international law. According to the second circuit, in
order for a norm to become a rule of customary international law
it must be “specific, universal, and obligatory.”38 The court
dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint against the corporate
defendants, holding that corporate liability has not risen to the
level of customary international law because there were only a
few historical examples and treaties that provided for such
liability.39
The plaintiffs appealed to the Supreme Court on the issue
of international corporate liability. However, the Supreme Court
ordered briefing on whether the Alien Tort Statute applied to
extraterritorial conduct beyond the jurisdiction of the United
States. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.40 The plaintiffs
subsequently argued that jurisdiction was proper under the ATS
because the respondents held corporate parents within the
United States.41 In Kiobel II, the court held that in order for
jurisdiction to arise under the Alien Tort Statute, the alleged
violations must sufficiently “touch and concern” the territorial
jurisdiction of the United States with sufficient force to displace
the presumption against extraterritoriality.42 In this regard,
Id. at 123.
Id. at 128.
38 Id. at 131.
39 Id. at 145.
40
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 132 S. Ct. 1738 (2012)
[hereinafter Kiobel I].
41 Kiobel II, 133 S. Ct. 1659.
42 Id. at 1673.
36
37

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol28/iss1/4

10

4 DAVID J SATNARINE (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

8/30/2016 3:53 PM

DESKTOP PUBLISHING EXAMPLE

171

mere corporate presence alone was not a sufficient basis for
application of the Alien Tort Statute and the court dismissed the
complaint.43
Significantly, the Kiobel II, left two important questions of
law unanswered. First, the Supreme Court did not definitively
rule on the issue of international corporate liability and whether
entities such as Company Y can be held liable for violations
under the Alien Tort Statute. Secondly, the Kiobel II decision
failed to precisely articulate under what circumstances the
presumption against extraterritoriality may be displaced under
the ATS. Instead, the Kiobel II court left for “another day the
determination of just when the presumption against
extraterritoriality might be overcome.”44 This analysis seeks to
affirmatively answer these two questions, and will do so in a
manner that persuasively allows a claim against Company Y to
be brought under the Alien Tort Statute.
II. CORPORATE LIABILITY AND KIOBEL’S SEARCH FOR
ATTRIBUTING
LIABILITY
TO
A CORPORATE
DEFENDANT
“Corporations have neither bodies to be punished, nor souls
to be condemned; they therefore do as they like.”
– Edward Thurlow, 1st Baron Thurlow.
The Supreme Court’s decision in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch
Petroleum Co.,45 [hereinafter Kiobel II] left open fundamental
questions regarding the liability of corporations under the Alien
Tort Statute [hereinafter ATS].46 Significantly, the Supreme
Court did not answer the question left open in Kiobel v. Royal
Dutch Petroleum Co.,47 [hereinafter Kiobel I] of whether
corporations could be liable for violations of customary
international law under the ATS. In order to hold the Central
Intelligence Agency corporate contractors liable for their
violations of customary law, the principle of corporate liability
must be addressed. Accordingly, part III of this analysis will
43
44
45
46
47

Id. at 1669.
Id. at 1673. (Breyer J., concurring).
Kiobel II, 133 S. Ct. (2013).
28 U.S.C. § 1350.
Kiobel I, 132 S. Ct. (2012).
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demonstrate that corporations could be held liable for violations
of customary norms in international law under the ATS. Thus,
much to the chagrin of the Lord Chancellor Thurlow,
corporations may be soulless legal entities, but they are not
immune from the consequences of their tortious conduct.
A. International principles holding Corporations liable for
tortious acts
It is an unquestionable fact that international tribunals and
courts have held corporations liable for violations of customary
and jus cogens norms. In fact, basic principles of international
law demand that corporations must be held liable for violations
of the law. A fundamental bedrock of international law is that
an aggrieved party has a right to an effective remedy.48 This
right is established by virtually every major human rights
accord.49 Numerous international tribunals and treaties
specifically attach corporate liability for tortious conduct and the
wide recognition of corporate liability has elevated this principle
to the status of customary international law. The question of
international corporate liability first received significant
attention within the Second Circuit. In Kiobel v. Royal Dutch
Petroleum Inc., the Second Circuit Court of Appeals stated “no
international tribunal of which we are aware has ever held a
corporation liable for a violation of the law of nations.50 However,
this assertion has been greatly criticized by scholars and other
courts.
48 Factory At Chorzow (Ger. v. Pol.), 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 17, at 29,
(Sept. 13).
49 See UDHR, supra note 18, at art. 8 (“Everyone has the right to an
effective remedy . . . for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him . . .
.”); see also id. at art. 14; ICCPR, supra note 18, arts. 2(3), 9(5), 14(6) (ensuring
remedies and compensation for wrongful convictions and imprisonment);
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, art. 6,
Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (“State Parties shall assure to everyone within
their jurisdiction effective protection and remedies”); see also Int’l Comm’n of
Jurists, Written Statement to the Ad-Hoc Committee on the Disability Rights
Convention, Need for an Effective Domestic Remedy in the Disability Rights
Convention,
Jan.
2005,
http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/enable/rights/
ahc5docs/ahc5icj.rtf. (“The right to an effective remedy is so firmly
enshrined . . . that any credible modern human rights treaty has to incorporate
it.”).
50 Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 132.
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A number of domestic courts are vehemently critical of the
assertion that international law does not proscribe corporate
liability. In Flomo v. Firestone Nat. Rubber Co., LLC, the
Seventh Circuit explicitly stated “[t]he factual premise of the
majority opinion in the Kiobel case is incorrect.”51 Moreover, in
In re S. African Apartheid Litig., the district court also
questioned the validity of the Kiobel’s assertion, and explicitly
stated that “the court’s conclusion that customary international
law does not recognize [corporate liability] is factually and
legally incorrect.”52 In fact, scholars and judges point to a
number of international tribunal decisions, including the very
same tribunal cited by the Kiobel court to demonstrate that
corporations are liable for customary international law and jus
cogens violations.
In the aftermath of World War II, the international
community sought to bring each perpetrator of the heinous
humanitarian violations and war crimes to justice. The swift
force of justice that ensued after World War II was not only
directed at individuals, but also towards corporations and other
financial institutions that played a part in facilitating the
atrocities that occurred in Germany. While historians correctly
assert that only individuals were tried at the Nuremberg
Trials,53 it does not follow that no corporation was ever held
accountable for their role in those atrocities. For instance, in the
judgments against executives of IG Farbenindustrie and Krupp,
the court specifically admonished two corporations for their role
in violating international law by stating:
We conclude from the credible evidence before us that the
confiscation of the Austin plant based upon German-inspired antiJewish laws and its subsequent detention by the Krupp firm
constitute a violation of Article 48 of the Hague Regulations which
requires that the laws in force in an occupied country be respected;
that it was also a violation of Article 46 of the Hague Regulations
51

2011).

Flomo v. Firestone Nat. Rubber Co., LLC, 643 F.3d 1013, 1017 (7th Cir.

52 In re S. African Apartheid Litig., 15 F.Supp.3d 454, 464 (S.D.N.Y. Apr.
17, 2014).
53
Brief Amici Curiae of Nuremberg Historians and International
Lawyers in Support of Neither Party, at 10; Kiobel I, 132 S. Ct. 472 (2011)
(arguing that Corporate officers, but not the corporation itself was tried at
Nuremberg).
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which provides that private property must be respected; that the
Krupp firm, through defendants . . . voluntarily and without
duress participated in these violations . . . and that there was no
justification for such action.54

Moreover, in Flomo v. Firestone Nat. Rubber Co., LLC, the
court cited to the Allied Control Council Laws ordering the
liquidation of assets of corporations found to assist the Nazi war
crimes.55 Consequently, the lack of corporate prosecution at
Nuremberg stemmed not from a void of international law, but
rather a recognition by Allied policy makers that “political and
economic stability [in Germany after World War II] could only
be achieved with the participation of German industry run by
the same managers, regardless of culpability.”56 In spite of this,
corporate liability as customary international law is not
dependent on the authority of international tribunals. Instead,
the norm exists separate and apart from an adjudicator.
An anchored reliance on international tribunals to
determine what actions constitute customary international law
is largely untenable and contradicts the essence of customary
international law. Customary International law is not defined
by decisions of international tribunals, rather it exists
independent of tribunals and is applied to specific facts
examined by those tribunals.57 It is significant to note that
54
United States v. Krupp, IX Trials of War Criminals Before the
Nuremberg Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law No. 10, 1351-52
(1952).
55 Flomo, 643 F.3d at 1017; In re S. African Apartheid Litig., at 465; see
also Control Council Law No. 2, “Providing for the Termination and
Liquidation of the Nazi Organizations,” Oct. 10, 1945, reprinted in 1
Enactments and Approved Papers of the Control Council and Coordinating
Committee 131 (1945); Control Council Law No. 9, “Providing for the Seizure
of Property Owned by I.G. Farbenindustrie and the Control Thereof,” Nov. 30,
1945, reprinted in 1 Enactments and Approved Papers of the Control Council
and
Coordinating
Committee
225,
http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/Enactments/law-index.pdf (last visited
Mar 13, 2015).
56 Jonathan A. Bush, The Prehistory of Corporations and Conspiracy in
International Criminal Law: What Nuremberg Really Said, 109 COLUM. L. REV.
1094, 1121 (2009).
57
Flomo, 643 F.3d at 1017 (holding that norms and remedies for
customary norms are not created by international tribunals but instead, only
enforced by them); see also Steven R. Ratner, Corporations and Human Rights:
A Theory of Legal Responsibility, 111 YALE L.J. 443, 476 (2001) (stating that
“the presence of a court holding a state responsible has never been the linchpin
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customary international law is not necessarily predicated on the
practice between states, but instead, recognized as the practice
of states.58 Moreover, since no precise timeline is necessary for
a norm to be deemed “custom,” a practice can develop into a
custom in a relatively short period of time if a sufficient number
of states embrace that norm as a legal responsibility.59 The
International Court of Justice has opined on this very fact, and
held that the ‘widespread and representative’ adoption of a
conventional/treaty rule by non-signatory states, coupled with
only the passage of a ‘short period’ of time, was all that was
required to transform conventional international law into
customary international law.”60 Accordingly, it is state practice
and their opinion juris (official pronouncements) that
demonstrate whether corporate liability exists as a customary
norm.61
State practice and their official pronouncements
demonstrate that corporate liability is a customary norm.
Instructively, the United States Supreme Court held that
federal courts should recognize claim “based on the present-day
law of nations if those claims rest on norm[s] of international
character accepted by the civilized world and defined with a
specificity comparable to the features of the 18th-century
paradigms.”62 Accordingly, the principle of corporate liability is
firmly rooted in the customary norm of holding actors
responsible for their violations of the law. Fist, virtually every
legal system holds corporations liable for their actions.63 In fact,
of the obligation itself.”).
58 North Sea Continental Shelf Cases at ¶¶ 37-38; Statute of the I.C.J.
art. 38; see also Restatement (Third) Of the Foreign Relations Law of the
United States, sections 102, 702 (1987); Roozbeh (Rudy) B. Baker, Customary
International Law in the 21st Century: Old Challenges and New Debates, EUR.
J ‘L INT’L Int. L. 21, 173-204, 180 (2010).
59 Roozbeh (Rudy) B. Baker, Customary International Law in the 21st
Century: Old Challenges and New Debates, EUR. J. INT’L L. 21, 173-204, 180
(2010).
60 North Sea Continental Shelf Cases at ¶ 41.
61 See also Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38(1), June
26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 1060, T.S. No. 993 [hereinafter ICJ Statute]
(Customary international law is the law of civilized nations).
62
Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. at 725 (2004) (internal citations and
quotations omitted).
63 See First National City Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior de
Cuba, 462 U.S. 611, 628-29, n.20 (1983); see also Exxon, 654 F.3d at 53 (holding
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many nations have reached further than civil liability for
corporations and have adopted domestic laws that proscribe both
civil and criminal liability on corporations.64 Accordingly, the
widely universal practice of corporate liability in nation states
demonstrates the requisite state practice element of a customary
norm. Secondly, the majority of nations have embraced
international corporate liability through treaties, United
Nations Resolutions, and international accords.65 For example,
numerous treaties related to environmental law and pollution
specifically impose liability on corporate actors.66 These
obligations directly implicate a corporation’s responsibility
under a web of legally binding international responsibilities.
Moreover, the widespread adoption and ratification of the
various environmental treaties indicate that corporations are
not exempt from liability under international law.
Even assuming arguendo that the ATS requires corporate
liability to be established by international tribunals, a number
of international tribunals have expressly held corporations
liable for civil and criminal violations. In the Barcelona
Traction case, the International Court of Justice explicitly held
that corporate liability is an essential element of “legal personhood.”); see also
The Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co. (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3, 3839 (Feb. 5) (holding that the “wealth of practice” across domestic legal systems
hold corporations liable for torts such as fraud or malfeasance).
64
See Edward B. Diskant, Comparative Corporate Criminal Liability:
Exploring the Uniquely American Doctrine Through Comparative Criminal
Procedure, 118 YALE L.J. 126, 130 (2008) (arguing that comparative regimes of
corporate liability hold corporations liable for violations of law, including
through administrative regulations and civil remedies); see also, Jodie A.
Kirshner, Why Is the U.S. Abdicating the Policing of Multinational
Corporations to Europe? Extraterritoriality, Sovereignty, and the Alien Tort
Statute, 30 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 259, 283 (2012) (emphasizing the rise of
criminal corporate responsibility in across the European Union and other
countries); see, e.g., Schweizerisches Strafgesetzbuch [StGB], CODE PENAL
SUISSE [CP], CODICE PÉNAL SVIZZERO [CP] [PENAL CODE] 2003, SR 311, RS 311,
art. 102 (Switz.) (Updating Switzerland’s Penal Code to include Criminal
Liability for Corporations).
65
See U.N. Office of Drugs and Crime, Legislative Guides for the
Implementation of the United Nations Convention against Transnational
Organized Crime and the Protocols Thereto, ¶ 243 (2004) (discussing various
international treaties and United Nations Resolutions pronouncing that
corporations should be liable for tortious conduct).
66 Steven R. Ratner, Corporations and Human Rights: A Theory of Legal
Responsibility, 111 Yale L.J. 443, 480 (2001) (discussing several environmental
treaties imposing liability on ship owners for environmental pollution).
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that a corporation can be held civilly liable for their actions
through a fundamental principles of international law – namely
the right to an effective remedy.67
Accordingly, the European Court of Justice has held
corporations civilly liable for acts such as discrimination on the
basis of nationality.68 In the criminal context, the Special
Tribunal for Lebanon (“STL”) specifically examined whether it
had authority to hold a corporation liable for obstruction of
justice charges pursuant to its United Nations Security Council
Mandate.69 The Lebanese International Tribunal held that “the
principles of interpretation laid down in customary
international. . . international standards on human rights [and]
general principles of international criminal law and
procedure . . . “ allowed the court to charge the corporate
defendants with obstruction of justice.70 The cumulative breadth
of these decisions demonstrates that international tribunals are
increasingly likely to hold corporations liable for unlawful
conduct in both the civil and criminal settings. Moreover, these
cases also demonstrate that the distinction between “natural”
and “legal” personhood is dissolved when international courts
seek to enforce remedies for international violations.
In light of the preceding, it is clear that the practice of the
majority of civilized nations deems corporations liable for

67 The Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co. (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J.
3, 38-39 (Feb. 5); Chorzów Factory (Ger. v. Pol.), 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 17,
at 29 (Sept. 13) (“It is a principle of international law, and even a general
conception of law, that any breach of an engagement involves an obligation to
make reparation”); Velásquez-Rodríguez v. Hond., Reparations and Costs,
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 7, ¶¶ 62- 64 (July 21, 1989); see also
Garrido & Baigorria v. Arg., Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R. (ser. C) No. 39, ¶ 40 (Aug. 27, 1998); accord, Durand & Ugarte v. Peru,
Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 89, ¶ 24
(Dec. 3, 2001) (“[A]ny violation of an international obligation carries with it the
obligation to make adequate reparation.”); Al-Adsani v. United Kingdom, 2001XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 79, 101.
68 Case 36/74, Walrave v. Association Union Cycliste Internationale, 1974
E.C.R. 1405, 1419, and gender; Case 43/75, Defrenne v. Société Anonyme
Belge de Navigation Aérienne Sabena, 1976 E.C.R. 455, 457-63.
69 S.C. Res. 1664, S/RES/ 1664 (Mar. 29, 2006).
70
Special Tribunal for Lebanon, In the Case against Akhbar Beirut
S.A.L. and Al-Amin (Contempt Judge), Case No. STL-14-06/I/CJ, ¶ 20 (31 Jan.
2014), http://www.stl-tsl.org/en/the-cases/contempt-cases/stl-14-06/filings-stl14-06/3091-f0001-1406.
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unlawful conduct. Moreover, states have evidenced these legal
commitments through international agreements and binding
domestic law. These components demonstrate the two essential
elements of a customary norm. International Tribunals have
translated this norm into enforceable judgments against
corporations, which imposes fines, liquidation, and regulatory
action for a corporation’s tortious conduct. Thus, there is ample
evidence of corporate liability in customary international law.
B. Corporate Liability Under the Alien Tort Statute in
Federal Common Law
While it is axiomatic that corporations can be held liable
violations of customary and jus cogens norms, the issue of
whether liability can attributed to corporations under the Alien
Tort Statute is less certain. In Kiobel I, the Supreme Court
ordered briefing on the issue of international corporate
liability.71 However, in Kiobel II, the court affirmed the Second
Circuit’s dismissal of the plaintiffs’ claims on other grounds.72 As
a result, lower courts have struggled with the Supreme Court’s
ambiguous holdings regarding corporate liability under the ATS.
In spite of this, there is significant harmony among the federal
circuit courts that corporations could be held liable under the
ATS. Moreover, some scholars even argue that the Supreme
Court acknowledged the existence of corporate liability under
the ATS when it assumed jurisdiction over the corporate
defendants in Kiobel II. Therefore, as this analysis will posit, the
near unilateral consensus among the federal circuit courts
demonstrate that corporate liability can be attributed to entities,
such as military corporations under the ATS.
Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Kiobel II, the
Seventh, Ninth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals had
each decided that corporations could be held liable for law of
nations violations under the ATS. In fact, prior to Kiobel II, only
the Second Circuit had determined that corporations were
immune from liability under ATS. However, since Kiobel II,
district courts within the Second Circuit have revisited the issue
and have definitively concluded that corporations could be held
71
72

Kiobel I, 132 S. Ct. at 1738.
Kiobel II, 133 S. Ct. at 1668-69.
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liable under the ATS. Therefore, the virtual unanimity among
the courts that have addressed this issue establishes a clear rule
of law that corporate defendants should be held liable for
violations of customary and jus cogens norms.
After the Supreme Court’s decision in Sosa v. AlvarezMachain,73 two circuit court opinions initially addressed the
issue of corporate liability in international law. First, in Romero
v. Drummond Co., Inc.,74 the corporate defendants could be held
liable under the ATS since extrajudicial killings are a violation
of the law of nations.75 Secondly, in Flomo v. Firestone Nat.
Rubber Co., LLC, the plaintiffs alleged that Firestone Natural
Rubber Company through its Liberian subsidiary that operated
a rubber plantation in Liberia violated a number of customary
and jus cogens norms, and brought an ATS suit against the U.S.
parent company.76 The Flomo court held that corporate liability
was not precluded under the ATS because international law has
recognized principles of corporate liability.77 Moreover, the
Flomo court argued that even assuming no international court
has ever held a corporation liable for customary international
law violations, there has to be a first time for a court to enforce
a customary norm. To decide otherwise would eviscerate any
possible future enforcement of a customary law violation.78
Two other circuit courts also examined the issue of corporate
liability issue under the ATS and reached similar conclusions on
different grounds. In Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC,79 the Ninth Circuit
determined that examination of ATS claims required a two-step
approach.80 First, a court should consider each violation of
international law to determine whether the violation is
sufficiently “specific, universal and obligatory.”81 Once a court
determines that the alleged conduct violates a customary or jus
cogens norm, federal common law allows the court to hold the
73
74
75
76
77
78
79

(2013).
80
81

Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542,U.S. 692 (2004).
Romero v. Drummond Co., Inc., 552 F.3d 1303 (11th Cir. 2008).
Id. at 1316.
Flomo, 643 F.3d at 1017.
Id. at 1017 (7th Cir. 2011).
Id. at 1017.
671 F.3d 736 (9th Cir. 2011), rev’d on other grounds, 133 S. Ct. 1995
Id. at 748.
Id.
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actors and their employers responsible for the tortious conduct.82
From this perspective, the remedies available for violations of
customary or jus cogens norms are found in the federal common
law.83 Additionally, the Sarei court found that not only could
corporate defendants be liable for violations of customary or jus
cogens norms, but that they could also be held liable for aiding
and abetting liability through federal common law.84 Although
the Sarei opinion was not the first Circuit decision to directly
address corporate liability under the ATS, it was the first to
examine the distinction between jurisdiction and federal
common law liability under the ATS.
The D.C. Circuit has also held that corporations could be
liable under the ATS pursuant to federal common law. In Doe v.
Exxon Mobil Corp.,85 the plaintiffs alleged that foreign corporate
subsidiaries of Exxon Mobil hired security forces that committed
“murder, torture, sexual assault, battery and false
imprisonment” against villagers in Indonesia.86 The plaintiffs
also alleged that Exxon security forces comprised of Exxon
employees and members of the Indonesian military, even though
Exxon management was aware that the security forces
committed heinous human rights abuses in the past. Moreover,
the Doe complaint argued that the actions of the Indonesian
military could be attributed to Exxon because the soldiers were
comprised of a unit dedicated to securing Exxon’s facilities in the
region and were subject to command and control by Exxon
employees.87 In concluding that Exxon could be held liable
under the ATS, the D.C. Circuit determined that “customary
international law does not provide the rule” to determine
whether corporations could be held liable under the ATS.88

Id. at 751.
Id. at 752; see also Efrain Staino, Suing Private Military Contractors
for Torture: How to Use the Alien Tort Statute Without Granting Sovereign
Immunity-Related Defenses, 50 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1277, 1285 (2010)
(arguing that proper application of the Sosa precedent requires courts to
provide Federal Common Law remedies to ATS violations).
84 Id.
85 Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 50 (D.C. Cir. 2011), vacated on
other grounds, 527 F. App’x 7 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
86 Id. at 16.
87 Id.
88 Id. at 41.
82
83
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Instead, the issue of corporate liability under the ATS is distinct
from whether a violation of a customary or jus cogens norm
occurred. Accordingly, the court must look to the federal common
law to determine the remedies available for ATS violations.89
Therefore, the Doe court held that since the common law at the
time of the passage of the ATS recognized corporate liability,
congress therefore anticipated corporate liability as a remedy for
an ATS violation.90
The Second Circuit is the only Circuit Court to reach a
different conclusion than others regarding corporate liability
under the ATS. Prior to the Supreme Court’s ruling in Kiobel I,
the Second Circuit initially addressed the question of corporate
liability. In Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., the court
determined that corporations could not be held liable under the
ATS.91 In reaching this conclusion, the stated:
Our recognition of a norm of liability as a matter of domestic law,
therefore, cannot create a norm of customary international law. In
other words, the fact that corporations are liable as juridical
persons under domestic law does not mean that they are liable
under international law (and, therefore, under the ATS).
Moreover, the fact that a legal norm is found in most or even all
“civilized nations” does not make that norm a part of customary
international law.92

According to the court’s argument, a corporation can only be
held liable under the ATS if corporate liability is a norm of
customary international law.93 The court went on to conclude
that international law recognized only individual liability for
violations of international law, and since no corporation has ever
been held liable for a violation of international law by an
international tribunal, there is no customary norm of corporate
liability.94
Some courts within the second circuit have adopted the
position that corporations are not liable under the ATS. For
example, in Tymoshenko v. Firtash, the district court rejected
89
90
91
92
93
94

Id.
Id. at 48.
Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 118.
Id.
Id. at 131.
Id. at 119, 132.
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the plaintiff’s argument that “because the Supreme Court did
not expressly foreclose corporate liability, their ATS claim
against [a corporate defendant] may proceed.”95 The
Tymoshenko Court determined that it was bound by the Second
Circuit’s decision in Kiobel regarding corporate liability under
the ATS because neither the Supreme Court nor the Second
Circuit has expressly decided the issue.96 Similarly, in Ahmad v.
Christian Friends of Israeli Communities, another district court
found that corporations are not liable under the ATS based on
the Second Circuit’s Kiobel precedent.97 However, recent district
court precedents within the Second Circuit have begun to adopt
the holdings of their sister circuits regarding corporate
liability.98 This development has created a growing discord
within the second circuit regarding the Kiobel findings. As a
result, subsequent Second Circuit decisions are vehemently
critical of fundamental premises in Kiobel and have specifically
refuted its findings.99
The central holding of Kiobel is no longer binding within the
second circuit. Other district courts within the Second Circuit
have seriously questioned the fundamental reasoning of the
Kiobel decision, and the Second Circuit Court of Appeals has
indicated that it’s initial Kiobel decision is no longer binding
within the Second Circuit. In Licci ex rel. Licci v. Lebanese
Canadian Bank, SAL,100 the Second Circuit remanded the issue
of corporate liability under the ATS to the district court because
“the Supreme Court’s opinion [in Kiobel II] did not directly
address the question of corporate liability under the ATS.”101
While the district court is yet to make a determination in Licci,
two other second circuit district courts have explicitly held that
corporations can be held liable under the ATS in light of the
Kiobel I and II precedents.
A number of District courts within the Second Circuit have
Tymoshenko v. Firtash, No. 11-CIV-2794 (KMW), 2013 WL 4564646, at
*3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 2013).
96 Id. at 6 n.4.
97 Ahmad v. Christian Friends of Israeli Cmtys., No. 13-CIV-3376 (JMF),
2014 WL 1796322, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
98 See notes 98-115 infra and supporting text.
99 Id.
100 732 F.3d 161 (2d Cir. 2013).
101 Id. at 174.
95
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been reluctant to embrace the Circuit’s own Kiobel precedent. In,
In Re: South African Apartheid Litigation,102 the Southern
District of New York held that the Supreme Court’s decisions,103
as well as the second circuit opinions in Licci and Chowdhury v.
Worldtel Bangladesh Holding, Ltd.,104 significantly undermined
the central holding of Kiobel – “that corporations cannot be held
liable for claims brought under the ATS.” – and left the question
open within the circuit.105 According to Apartheid Litigation, the
Tymoshenko decision was reached prior to the Licci and
Chowdhury decisions and relied exclusively on the Second
Circuit’s Kiobel precedent.106 Therefore, Apartheid Litigation
concluded that because Tymonshenko issue of corporate liability
under the ATS was still an open question within the circuit.107
The Apartheid Litigation opinion went on to significantly
criticize the Second Circuit’s standing as an outlier among other
courts in finding that no corporation has been held liable by an
international tribunal and further, that corporations are
immune from liability under the ATS. The Apartheid Litigation
court stated that the Second Circuit’s decision in Kiobel not only
failed to recognize corporate liability in international law, but
also incorrectly conflated the issue of whether a tort violates a
customary norm with the remedies available for that norm.108 As
a result, Apartheid Litigation concluded that the ATS
contemplated federal common law to govern what remedies were
available for a violation of a customary or jus cogens norm, and
further, that “nothing in the text, history or purposes of the ATS
indicates that corporations are immune from liability on the
basis of federal common law.”109
Another district court within the second circuit also reached

102

Litig.]

15. F.Supp.3d 454 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 17, 2014) [hereinafter Apartheid

103 Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 762, 187 L. Ed. 2d 624 (2014);
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013)
104 746 F.3d 42, 57 (2d Cir.) cert. denied sub nom. 135 S. Ct. 401 (2014)
105 Apartheid Litig., 15 F.Supp.3d at 460.
106 Id.
107 Id. at 461.
108 Id. at 463 (noting that far “from implying that natural persons and
corporations are treated differently for purposes of civil liability under the ATS,
the [Sosa Court] intended . . . that they are treated identically”).
109 Id. at 464.
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the same conclusion. In Sikhs for Justice Inc. v. Indian Nat’l
Cong. Party,110 the court also found that corporations could be
liable for ATS violations.111 Similar to the Apartheid Litigation
holding, the Sikhs for Justice Inc., decision significantly
criticized the Second Circuit’s Kiobel decision and largely
adopted the reasoning of the Apartheid Litigation.112 Moreover,
Sikhs for Justice Inc. expressly held that “the Supreme Court’s
recent opinions suggest that holding corporate defendants liable
under the statute, assuming other jurisdictional requirements
are met, is appropriate.”113
As a result of these precedents, there is a growing consensus
that the Kiobel holding is no longer binding precedent. Two
Second Circuit District Courts have emphatically embraced the
holdings of other jurisdictions and expressly held that
corporations could be liable under the ATS.114 Accordingly, the
Second Circuit’s position as the sole jurisdiction to hold
corporations immune from liability under the ATS is
significantly diminished, and largely untenable when viewed
outside the doctrine of stare decisis. Recent decisions by other
courts have reached the same conclusion at the district courts
within the second circuit regarding corporate liability under the
ATS. In the Eleventh Circuit, the court examined a plaintiffs’
ATS claim and held that a corporation could be held liable for
ATS violations through the federal common law.115 Similarly, in
William v. AES Corp.,116 the Eastern District of Virginia
specifically held that although a plaintiff’s Alien Tort Statute
claim failed because it did not have a sufficient nexus to the
United States, the defendants were not immune under the
statute merely because of their corporate status.117 In light of
these precedents, courts are increasingly unwilling to hold a

110 17 F. Supp.3d 334 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 25, 2014) aff’d sub nom, Sikhs for
Justice, Inc. v. Nath, No. 14-1724-CV, 2014 WL 7232492 (2d Cir. Dec. 19, 2014).
111 Id.
112 Id. at 341.
113 Id.
114 See Apartheid Litig., 15. F.Supp.3d at 454; Sikhs for Justice Inc., 17
F. Supp.3d at 334.
115 Doe v. Drummond Co., Inc., 782 F.3d 576, 584 (11th Cir. 2015).
116 No. 1:14CV343 JCC/TRJ, 2014 WL 2896012 (E.D. Va. June 26, 2014).
117 William v. AES Corp., 28 F.Supp.3d 553 (E.D. Va. 2014).
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corporate defendant immune under the ATS.118 As a result, this
analysis has demonstrated that the ATS provides a sufficient
remedy against Company Y for engaging in inhumane and
tortious interrogation techniques upon detainees within the
CIA’s Interrogation and Detention Program. This analysis will
now to turn to the jurisdictional issue under the ATS and argue
that that Company Y is subject to the jurisdiction of U.S. Courts
under the ATS.
III.

DISPLACING THE PRESUMPTION AGAINST
EXTRATERRITORALITY IN KIOBEL II

In Kiobel II, the Supreme Court held that the ATS did not
provide an explicit grant of extraterritorial jurisdiction, and
“even where [ATS] claims touch and concern the territory of the
United States, they must do so with sufficient force to displace
the presumption against extraterritorial application.”119
Notably, the court failed to articulate a precise standard to
determine whether an ATS claim sufficiently touches and
concerns the territory of the United States, and what conduct
may be deemed sufficient to displace the presumption against
extraterritorial application.120 Indeed, the crafters of the ATS
did not envision that corporations such as Company Y would be
able to commit heinous violations of customary law with
impunity and eviscerate the congressionally intended
protections of the ATS, rendering the practical effect the statute
gutless and hollow. As this analysis will posit, private military
corporations may be held accountable for violations of customary
law overseas where their actions have a sufficient nexus to the
United States. Further, where military contractors commit
violations of customary international law, a plaintiff may be able
E.g., Du Daobin v. Cisco Systems, Inc., 2 F.Supp.3d 717 (D. Md. 2014)
(examining whether the corporate defendants could be held liable under the
ATS for aiding the Chinese government to suppress the privacy and free speech
rights of the plaintiffs in China); id. (The Du Daobin court did not specifically
address the status of the corporate defendants, but specifically stated, “this
Court harbors doubt that corporations are immune under the ATS).
119 Kiobel II, 133 S. Ct. at 1669 (2013).
120 Kiobel II at 1669 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (the ATS may still “reach”
abroad); id. at 1673 (Breyer, J., (concurring) (the majority’s standard “leaves
for another day the determination of just when the presumption against
extraterritoriality may be overcome).
118
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to assert ATS jurisdiction over these corporations by
demonstrating that some relevant conduct occurred within a
territory of the United States. Lastly, where private military
corporations violate international law in territories where the
United States exercises de facto sovereignty, those actions may
also meet the necessary jurisdictional requirements of the Kiobel
II holding.
A. Private Military Contractors may be held liable for
customary law violations that occurred overseas under the
ATS where plaintiffs are able to establish that some
‘relevant conduct’ occurred within the United States
A cornerstone of the Kiobel II decision is the requirement
that ATS claims must “touch and concern the territory of the
United States with sufficient force to displace the presumption
against extraterritorial application.”121 However, the majority in
Kiobel II failed to articulate any guidance on how lower courts
should apply the “touch and concern” requirement to ATS
claims.122 The concurring opinions sought to remedy this
ambiguity by proposing two approaches. According to Justice
Alito’s concurrence, an ATS claim falls outside the scope of the
presumption—and thus is not barred by the presumption—only
if the event or relationship that was the ‘focus’ of congressional
concern under the relevant statute takes place within the United
States.”123 Justice Breyer articulated a factor based approach
that would give rise to jurisdiction under the ATS, which would
arise when “(1) the alleged tort occurs on American soil, (2) the
defendant is an American national, or (3) the defendant’s
conduct substantially and adversely affects an important
American national interest, and that includes a distinct interest
in preventing the United States from becoming a safe harbor
(free of civil as well as criminal liability) for a torturer or other
Id..
Doe I v. Nestle USA Inc., 766 F.3d 1013, 1028 (9th Cir. 2014);
Tymoshenko, 2013 WL 4564646, at *4 (“[T]he Court failed to provide guidance
regarding what is necessary to satisfy the ‘touch and concern’ standard.”).
123
Id. (Alito, J., concurring); see also id. (Kennedy, J., concurring);
Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 268, (2010) (holding that
courts should look to the ‘focus’ of congressional intent when seeking to
determine the extraterritorial reach of a statute).
121
122
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common enemy of mankind.”124 A number of courts have applied
these approaches and found jurisdiction under the ATS where
plaintiffs allege extensive, substantial or specific, relevant
domestic conduct.125 Accordingly, Company Y may be held liable
for violations of customary law that occurred overseas under the
ATS where a plaintiff is able to establish a sufficient nexus
between Company Y’s interrogation techniques to a territory of
the United States.
A number of courts have determined that ATS claims
against private military corporations sufficiently touch and
concern the territory of the United States when the plaintiffs are
able to show specific relevant domestic conduct. For instance, in
Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Technology, Inc.,126 the plaintiff was
a detainee in Abu Ghraib prison during the U.S. occupation of
Iraq.127 The defendant was a U.S. corporation who provided
civilian interrogators that committed heinous and sadistic acts
of violence and criminal abuses against the detainees at the
prison.128 In displacing the ATS’ presumption against
extraterritoriality, the court found that there was extensive
relevant conduct within a U.S. territory to warrant jurisdiction
under the ATS. In Al Shimari, the CACI interrogators were
themselves U.S. citizens, the interrogators were hired in the
U.S. pursuant to a contract executed with the U.S. Department
of Interior in Arizona, and the interrogators received security
clearances that were issued by the U.S. Department of
Defense.129 Furthermore, the plaintiff contended that “CACI’s
managers located in the United States were aware of reports of
misconduct abroad, attempted to cover up the misconduct, and
“implicitly, if not expressly, encouraged it.”130 Accordingly, the
Al-Shimari court found that the plaintiffs alleged extensive and
specific conduct of the defendants that occurred within the
territory of the U.S. to displace the presumption against
Kiobel II, at 1671 (Breyer, J., concurring).
Doe v. Drummond Co. Inc., 782 F.3d 576, 593 (11th Cir. 2015); Al
Shimari v. CACI Premier Tech. Inc., 758 F.3d 516, 529 (4th Cir. 2014); Mastafa
v. Chevron Corp., 770 F.3d 170, 195 (2d Cir. 2014).
126 758 F.3d at 516.516, (4th Cir. 2014).
127 Al Shimari, 758 F.3d 516 at 516.
128 Id. at 521.
129 Id. at 528-29.
130 Id.
124
125
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extraterritoriality.
Similarly, the Second Circuit found that specific conduct
between a defendant located in the U.S. and the perpetrators of
human rights abuses abroad displaced the presumption against
extraterritoriality under the ATS. In Mastafa v. Chevron
Corp.,131 the plaintiffs alleged that defendants engineered a
corrupt banking agreement that allowed the Saddam Hussein
regime to circumvent international economic sanctions and that
defendant “aided and abetted the abuses of the Saddam Hussein
regime by paying the regime kickbacks and other unlawful
payments, which enabled the regime to survive and perpetrate
the abuses suffered by plaintiffs.”132 The Second Circuit found
that the corporate defendants structured fraudulent contractual
agreements and overtly conspired within the U.S. to evade the
international sanctions regime against Iraq.133 Thus, the court
determined that the overt actions, including a combination of
carefully structured financial transactions, which occurred
within the U.S., were sufficient to displace the presumption
against extraterritoriality.134
The Eleventh Circuit also considered the Al Shimari factors
in deciding whether the plaintiffs’ ATS claims displaced the
presumption against extraterritoriality, but the court reached a
different conclusion because the plaintiffs’ jurisdictional claims
lacked specificity. In Doe v. Drummond Co., Inc., the plaintiff
brought suit against corporate defendants within the United
States who allegedly contracted with paramilitary groups in
Colombia to eliminate opposition to the defendants’ mining
operations in Colombia.135 The plaintiff raised three “focus”
arguments
in
addressing
the
presumption
against
extraterritoriality. First, the corporate defendants in the instant
action are domiciled in the United States. Secondly, the
paramilitary group contracted by the defendants are labeled as
a terrorist organization by the U.S. government, thus there are
strong national interests. Lastly, the defendants’ agreement to
conspire, aid, abet, and fund the terrorist organization occurred
131
132
133
134
135

770 F.3d at 170. (2d Cir. 2014).
Id. at 175.
Id. at 191.
Id.
Drummand Co, Inc., 782 F. 3d at 580.
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within the United States.136 In addressing the plaintiffs’ focus
arguments, the Drummond court relied on previous circuit
precedent to hold that “general allegations of agreement with
and support of the AUC did not warrant displacement” of the
presumption against extraterritoriality.137 Additionally, the
plaintiffs in Drummond failed to offer any specific allegations of
instances where the defendants conspired with Colombian
paramilitary forces within the United States. Accordingly, the
Drummond court held that the plaintiffs did not proffer any
specific, relevant domestic conduct to support their ATS
claims.138 However, the Drummond court did not foreclose on the
possibility that domestic financial transactions and agreements
could serve as a basis for jurisdiction under the ATS. In fact, the
Drummond court did find relevant the corporate citizenship of
the defendants, the status of the paramilitary group as a
designated terrorist organization by the U.S. government, and
the alleged transactional conduct by the defendants.139
B. The relationship between the CIA and its Contractors
during the agency’s Interrogation and Detention program
establish sufficient ‘relevant domestic conduct’ to hold the
contractors liable for violations of customary law under the
ATS
Application of Al-Shimari, Drummond, and Mastafa
framework demonstrate a viable ATS litigation strategy against
private military contractors, such as CIA interrogators who
utilized ‘enhanced interrogation’ techniques. Through the CIA’s
interrogation and detention program, these contractors
committed serious human rights abuses that were clear
violations of customary law.140 Moreover, there is significant
“relevant domestic conduct” to displace the presumption against
extraterritoriality under the ATS with regard to the CIA’s
interrogation and detention program. The CIA engaged in
extensive financial and contractual relations with private

136
137
138
139
140

Id. at 594.
Id. at 596.
Id. at 599; Mastafa, 770 F.3d at 195.
Drummond Co. Inc., 782 F.3d at 598-600.
See generally Amnesty Int’l Report, supra note 14.
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contractors within the interrogation and detention program.141
The private military corporation was headquartered and
incorporated within the United States, and at least two of the
interrogators who designed and implemented the enhanced
interrogation techniques held medical licenses within the
United States.142 Lastly, corporate employees conspired with
CIA officials within the United States to shield the true nature
of the interrogation and detention program from public
officials.143 These factors strongly indicate that relevant
domestic conduct exists within the relationship between the CIA
and its privately contracted interrogators to warrant a
displacement of the presumption against extraterritoriality
under the ATS.
In 2002, the CIA contracted two psychologists to draft and
implement ‘enhanced interrogation techniques.144 Media outlets
and various public records have identified the two psychologists
as Dr. James Elmer Mitchell and Dr. Bruce Jessen, both of
whom held medical practitioners licenses within the United
States.145 The techniques drafted and implemented by the two
psychologists were found to be in violation of numerous
international conventions and treaties against torture and
inhumane treatment.146 Mitchell and Jessen incorporated a
private military corporation (“Company Y”), within the United
States147 and contracted with the CIA to provide interrogators
and “operational psychologists, debriefers, and security
personnel at CIA detention site[s].”148 By 2005, the CIA had
Mastafa, 770 F.3d at 192.
Al-Shimari, 758 F.3d at 528-29.
143 Mwani v. Bin Laden, 947 F.Supp.2d 1, 5 (D.D.C.2013) (ATS claims
touched and concerned the United States because plaintiffs had “presented
evidence that . . . overt acts in furtherance of [the defendants’] conspiracy took
place in the United States”).
144 SSCI Report, supra note 16, at 21.
145
U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee, Senate Armed Services
Committee Inquiry Into The Treatment of Detainees in U.S. Custody 1-7
(2008) [hereinafter Senate Armed Services Report]; Petition for Judicial
Review, Cox v. Texas State Bd. of Examiners Of Psychologists, No. D-1-GN-11001285, 2011 WL 1652243 (D.Tex. Apr. 29, 2011).
146 SSCI Report, supra note 16, at Findings and Conclusions p. 3.
147 Various reports have identified Company Y as “Mitchell, Jessen and
Associates” a private military consulting corporation incorporated in the
United States. Senate Armed Services Report, supra note 145 at 24.
148 Id. at 169.
141
142
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effectively outsourced its interrogation and detention program
to Company Y.149 Company Y received numerous payments from
the CIA for its services, procured a five million dollar
indemnification contract with the agency, and received
approximately one million dollars in legal representation costs,
which included legal services provided at a Senate Committee
briefing.150
Significantly, the Company Y officials designed, planned
and executed the strategic use of torture as an enhanced
interrogation technique within the United States, or with
officials located within the United States, and exported those
techniques to be utilized against detainees held in U.S. custody
overseas. Company Y contractors created programs and
techniques in the United States and acted in concert with the
CIA headquarters to conceptualize and design torture
techniques, exported these techniques to the CIA’s Black Sites,
“personally applied them to detainees, conducted psychological
evaluations of detainees whom they would torture, trained other
interrogators in the use of torture, and recommended what
techniques should be employed on which detainees.”151 The
design and implementation of the interrogation tactics are
similar to that of a bomb maker who manufacturers an
improvised explosive device within the United States and then
exports that device to be utilized in a terrorist attack overseas.152
The corporate status of Company Y, the contractual
relationship between the CIA and Company Y, and the overt

SSCI Report, supra note 16, Findings and Conclusions at 11.
Id.
151 Keller, Dougherty, et.al, Doing Harm: Health Professionals’ Central
Role in the CIA Torture Program, Physicians for Human Rights, Dec. 2014 at
5, http://physiciansforhumanrights.org/library/
reports/doing-harm-health-professionals-central-role-in-the-cia-tortureprogram.html; see also SSCI Report, supra note 16, at Findings and
Conclusions p. 11.
152
See Sexual Minorities Uganda v. Lively, 960 F.Supp.2d 304, 309
(D.Mass. 2013) (“Defendant’s alleged actions in planning and managing a
campaign of repression [overseas] from the United States are analogous to a
terrorist designing and manufacturing a bomb in this country, which he then
mails [overseas] with the intent that it explodes there”); Mwani v. Al Qaeda,
No. CV 99-125 (JMF), 2014 WL 4749182, at 8 (D.D.C. Sept. 25, 2014) (terrorist
attack that was plotted in part within the United States is sufficient to displace
the presumption against extraterritoriality).
149
150
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actions of CIA officials to shield the program from public
scrutiny and attempts to cover up the torture of detainees within
the Interrogation program are relevant factors in determining
whether an ATS claim against Company Y displaces the
presumption against extraterritoriality.153 Moreover, since
Company Y was arguably created for the specific purpose of
committing human rights violations overseas at the behest of a
U.S. intelligence agency, there are significant national and
domestic interests that warrant displacement of the
presumption against extraterritoriality.154 In instances, such as
here, where a corporation is formed specifically within the U.S.
for the sole purpose of effectuating illegal activity abroad, courts
have determined that the process of domestic incorporation is
relevant in domestic conduct to displace the presumption
against extraterritoriality.155
Company Y managers were also aware of unauthorized and
unlawful interrogation techniques that were either ignored or
encouraged by CIA officials within the United States SSCI
Report, Findings and Conclusions at 12. Extensive
communication between Company Y and CIA officials
demonstrate that CIA officials and Company Y officials were
aware of the torture being inflicted upon detainees and
continued to encourage the use of the illegal interrogation
techniques.156 In one particular instance, a medical officer
153 Al Shimari, 758 F.3d at 529 (noting that acts of torture committed by
U.S. citizens, employed by a U.S. corporation, acting pursuant to a contract
procured with a U.S. agency constituted relevant domestic conduct); Lively, at
311-12 (holding that Kiobel did not bar ATS claims because some relevant
conduct was based on activities that occurred within the United States”).
154 SSCI Report, supra note 16, Executive Summary at p. 12 (by 2008,
approximately 85% of the CIA’s interrogation program was staffed by the sole
source contract procured by Company Y).
155
Lively, 960 F.Supp.2d at 309; Mwani, 947 F.Supp.2d at 5 (where
defendants laid criminal plans within the U.S. for the specific purpose of
exporting those crimes abroad, those acts constitute relevant domestic
conduct); Kiobel II, 133 S.Ct., at 1671 (Breyer, J., concurring) (the defendant’s
conduct substantially and adversely affects an important American national
interest, and that includes a distinct interest in preventing the United States
from becoming a safe harbor (free of civil as well as criminal liability) for a
torturer or other common enemy of mankind”).
156 SSCI Report, supra note 16, at Executive Summary, p. 168, n. 128
(noting extensive communication between Company Y and CIA headquarters
within the United States); id. at Executive Summary, p. 99.
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remarks on the aggressive waterboarding of detainees stating in
an e-mail that “the requirements coming from home are really
unbelievable in terms of breadth and detail.’”157 Accordingly, the
blatant disregard for the rights of the detainees through the
continued use of enhanced interrogation techniques in spite of
its illegality, and the tacit approval given by Company Y officials
within the U.S. established sufficient relevant domestic
conduct.158
Cumulatively, the extensive entanglement between the CIA
and Company Y to administer the Interrogation and Detention
Program demonstrate sufficient relevant conduct to displace the
presumption against extraterritoriality under the ATS. The
corporate citizenship of Company Y, its assets, officers, and
employees all possess significant contacts with the United
States. Moreover, the heinous abuse and torture effectuated by
Company Y interrogators upon detainees at CIA Black Sites
represent the very behavior that congress intended the ATS to
prohibit. Namely, the United States possess a moral
responsibility to prohibit domestic corporations such as
Company Y from committing heinous acts of torture overseas
with perceived impunity.159
C. The United States maintained de facto sovereignty over
‘Black Sites’ within the CIA’s Interrogation and Detention

157 SSCI Report, supra note 16 at Executive Summary p. 84; id. at 145
(noting a CIA Inspector General report; stating that there is a strong argument
that the enhanced interrogation techniques violates international and
domestic law); U.S. Dep’t of Justice Office of the Inspector
Gen., A Review of the FBI’s Involvement in and Observations of Detainee Inter
rogations in
Guantanamo Bay, Afghanistan, and Iraq xxvii,
368
(2008)(Department of Justice report noting that Federal Bureau of
Investigations Agents did not attempt to dissuade contractors from using
enhanced interrogation techniques despite knowledge of its illegality because
the policies were approved at “high levels”).
158 Al Shimari, 758 F.3d at 531 (finding relevant domestic conduct under
the ATS where a private military corporation’s mangers “gave tacit approval
to the acts of torture committed by . . . employees at the Abu Ghraib prison,
attempted to ‘cover up the misconduct, and ‘implicitly, if not expressly,
encouraged it”).
159
Kiobel II, 133 S.Ct. at 1671 (Breyer, concurring) (noting that the
United States holds a distinct interest in preventing itself “from becoming a
safe harbor . . . for a torturer or other common enemy of mankind”).
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Program
In Kiobel II, the Supreme Court decided that territorial
jurisdiction is an essential component of ATS claims.160
However, the majority analysis’s was careful to confine
territorial jurisdiction to “a territory of” the United States, not
exclusively “within” the United States.161 The touch and concern
analysis is conducted on a case-by-case basis and applied in a
manner that “does not typically impose the sovereign will of the
United States onto conduct occurring within the territorial
jurisdiction of another sovereign.”162 As a result, application of
the ATS is proper in cases where the underlying wrongful
conduct occurred in territories overseas where U.S. law is
operative (either by treaty or another method).163 Absent formal
sovereignty, territories under the exercise and control of the
United States are “de facto” territories of the United States.
Accordingly, U.S. law is applicable to the de facto territories
under the control of the United States.164 As a result, this
analysis will demonstrate that Company Y’s illegal
interrogation techniques occurred within de facto territories of
Id. at 1667.
Id. (citing Bolchos, 3 F. Cas. at 810-11 (wrongful seizure of slaves from
a vessel while in port in the United States); Moxon, 17 F. Cas. at 942-45
(wrongful seizure in United States territorial waters, outside the geographic
territory of the United States).
162
Id. at 1667; see Foreign Relations Law-Alien Tort Statute-Fourth
Circuit Allows Alien Tort Statute Claim Against Abu Ghraib Contractor.-al
Shimari v. Caci Premier Technology, Inc.: Fourth Circuit Allows Alien Tort
Statute Claim Against Abu Ghraib Contractor, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1534, 1537
(2015) (noting a primary justification for the presumption against
extraterritoriality is to prevent conflicts between national laws).
163 See O’Reilly De Camara v. Brooke, 209 U.S. 45, 51 (1908) (noting that
the ATS applied to extraterritorial conduct because of a treaty between the
U.S. and Spain that made U.S. law operative in Cuba during a U.S. occupation
of the country); Fleming v. Page, 50 U.S. 603, 614 (1850) (finding that the
United States exercised dominion and control over the Port of Tampico, Mexico
where “the country was in the exclusive and firm possession of the United
States, and governed by its military authorities, acting under the orders of the
President”); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 468 (2004) (holding that the ATS may
apply to actions in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba because the United States
maintained complete jurisdiction and control over the territory as
demonstrated by an express lease agreement).
164
Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 755 (2008) (finding that the
“United States, by virtue of its complete jurisdiction and control over the base
[in Cuba], maintains de facto sovereignty over [Guantanamo Bay, Cuba]”).
160
161
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the United States to give rise to jurisdiction under the ATS.
The United States exercises practical sovereignty over
territories within the CIA’s Interrogation and Detention
program.165 Unlike de jure sovereignty, practical sovereignty is
a justiciable question that allows courts to examine the degree
of control the United States exerts over a territory.166 In order to
make this determination, courts must determine whether the
United States, for all practical purposes, [is] answerable to no
other sovereign for its acts” in that territory.167 This analysis
must be done on a case-by-case basis and take into account the
following: 1) the legal authorities for U.S. control over a
territory; 2) the length of military occupation and whether the
U.S. intended to displace foreign law;168 3) the inherent dangers
of an occupied territory; and 4) the host’s nation jurisdiction and
whether application of domestic law would “cause friction with
a host government.”169
It is axiomatic that U.S. maintains de facto sovereignty over
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and other CIA Black Sites which
comport with Boumediene’s practical sovereignty analysis.170
For example, in March 2003, the United States assumed
complete jurisdiction and sovereignty over Iraq by dethroning
its government and serving as the principal administrator of the
Coalition Provincial Authority (hereinafter “CPA”).171 The CPA
Id. at 754.
Id.
167 Id. at 769.
168 Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 768.
169 Id. at 769.
170
Id. at 755; Rasul, 542 U.S. at 480; See, e.g., Judgments, AlNashiri v. Poland, (Eur. Ct. H. R. Jul. 24, 2014) (Application 28761/11)
(holding that “Poland knew of the nature and purposes of the CIA’s activities
on its territory at the material time and that, by enabling the CIA to use its
airspace and the airport, by its complicity in disguising the movements of
rendition aircraft and by its provision of logistics and services, including the
special security arrangements, the special procedure for landings, the
transportation of the CIA teams with detainees on land, and the securing of
the Stare Kiejkuty base for the CIA’s secret detention, Poland cooperated in
the preparation and execution of the CIA rendition, secret detention and
interrogation operations on its territory.”); Salim v. Mitchell, No. CV-15-0286JLQ, 2016 WL 1717185, at *1 (E.D. Wash. Apr. 28, 2016).
171 See e.g., The Imminent Transfer of Sovereignty of Iraq: Hearing Before
the H.Comm. on International Relations., 108th Cong. 19-20 (2004) (Statement
of Lt. Gen. Walter L. Sharp, Director, Strategic Plans and Policy, The Joint
165
166
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functioned as the government of Iraq with plenary legal and
political power.172 Congress appropriated funds for the
administration of the CPA and referred to Iraqi territory “as an
entity of the U.S. Government” in the CPA’s appropriation
bill.173 Additionally, the government of the United States
explicitly referred to the CPA as an “instrumentality” of the
United States.174 Significantly, the CPA effectively preempted
Iraqi law in its territory. The CPA granted immunity to
contractors from liability in Iraqi courts and provided that
United States domestic law would apply to the activities of
contractors.175 Accordingly, the underlying rationale of avoiding
displacement of another sovereign’s domestic law did not apply
to the territory of Iraq at that time.176
The fundamental rationale underlying the presumption
against extraterritorial application of the ATS did not apply to
Afghanistan during the period where Company Y was
conducting enhanced interrogation techniques in the country.
Staff) (noting that MNF-I “is subordinate to General Abizaid as Commander,
U.S. Central Command”); U.S. OFFICE OF MGMT. AND BUDGET, Pub. L.
No.PUBLIC LAW 108-11, 108th, CONG., REP ON EMERGENCY WARTIME
SUPPLEMENTAL
APPROPRIATIONS
ACT,
2003
(2003),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/omb/legislative/150
6.pdf (The CPA exercises powers of government temporarily in order to provide
for the effective administration of Iraq . . . The CPA is vested by the President
with all executive, legislative and judicial authority necessary to achieve its
objectives . . . The CPA Administrator has primary responsibility for exercising
this authority).
172 See Coalition Provisional Authority, Coalition Provisional Authority
Regulation Number 1, §1.2 (May 16, 2003) (“The CPA is vested with all
executive, legislative and judicial authority necessary to achieve its
objectives . . .”).
173 See Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for the Defense and
Reconstruction of Iraq and Afghanistan, 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-106, 117 Stat.
1209, 1225, 1236 (Nov. 6, 2003).
174 See Supplemental Brief of the United States at 2, United States ‘exex
rel. DRC, Inc. v. Custer Battles, LLC, 472 F. Supp. 2d 787 (E.D. Va. 2007) (No.
1:04cv199); U.S. ex rel. DRC, Inc. v. Custer Battles, LLC, 562 F.3d 295, 306
(4th Cir. 2009)(holding that there is sufficient evidence to conclude that the
CPA could be deemed an instrumentality of the United States government).
175 See SUHAIL NAJIM ABDULLAH AL SHIMARI, Taha Yaseen Arraq
Rashid, Salah Hasan Nusaif Al-Ejaili, Asa'ad Hamza Hanfoosh Al-Zuba'e,
Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. CACI PREMIER TECHNOLOGY, INC., Caci
International, Inc., Defendants-Appellees, Timothy Dugan, L-3 Services, Inc.,
Defendants., 2013 WL 5823704 (C.A.4), 34
176 Kiobel II , 133 S.Ct, at 1665.
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In Kiobel II, Justice Breyer strongly stressed the principles of
comity as the underlying rationale against extraterritorial
extension of the ATS. However, in instances where the law of a
foreign sovereign does not apply, the rationale of the
presumption is no longer applicable.177 Similar to Guantanamo,
the United States exerted practical sovereignty over military
installations in Afghanistan during the time period where
detainees were subject to torture by Company Y. The lease
agreement between Afghanistan and the United States
conferred “exclusive, peaceable, undisturbed, and uninterrupted
possession” of the Bagram Airbase.178 The United States’ control
over the Bagram was exclusive, perpetual, and terminable or
transferrable only in its sole discretion.179 The agreement
further confers the United States complete control and
jurisdiction over Bagram “. . . without any interruption
whatsoever by the host nation or its agents.”180 Additionally, the
Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) between the United States
and Afghanistan ceded core functions of Afghan sovereignty to
the U.S.181 The practical effect of the U.S. control within
Afghanistan during the CIA Interrogation and Detention
program demonstrate that the U.S. maintained complete control
177 Kiobel II, 133 S.Ct at 1659 (Breyer, J., concurring); see Dawinder S.
Sidhu, Shadowing the Flag: Extending the Habeas Writ Beyond Guantanamo,
20 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 39, 56 (2011).
178 Respondents’ Motion to Dismiss First Amended Petition for Writ of
Habeas Corpus at Exh. 1, Exh. A to Tennison Declaration ¶ 9, al Maqaleh v.
Gates, 604 F. Supp. 2d (D.D.C. 2008) (No. 06-1669) (offering as an exhibit to
the Tennison Declaration, the Accommodation Consignment Agreement For
Lands and Facilities at Bagram Airfield Between the Islamic Republic of
Afghanistan and the United States of America (Sept. 26, 2006) [hereinafter
Bagram Lease].
179 Bagram Lease, at ¶ 4, 9, 12.
180 Id. at ¶ 9.
181 See Respondents’ Motion to Dismiss First Amended Petition for Writ
of Habeas Corpus, al Maqaleh v. Gates, 604 F. Supp. 2d (D.D.C. 2008) (No. 061669); Diplomatic Note from Embassy of the United States delivered to the
Afghan Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Sep. 26, 2002) Tennison Decl., Ex. 2;
Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Note,
May 28, 2003, Tennison Decl., Ex. A [herineafter Afghan SOFA]
http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2009/04/bagram-ruling-bates4-2-09.pdf (noting that American personnel within Afghanistan were subject
only to U.S. criminal jurisdiction, and ceded sovereign functions to the U.S.
government such as immigration control, customs enforcement, and
infrastructure development).
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over the territory, and “for all practical purposes, [was]
answerable to no other sovereign for its acts” within the
country.182
Exercising jurisdiction over a de facto U.S. territory under
the domestic laws is not without historical precedent. In O’Reilly
De Camara v. Brooke, the Supreme Court examined a Cuban
national’s ATS claim against a U.S. military Governor of
Havana during the United States occupation of Cuba in the
early twentieth century.183 The plaintiff was a sheriff in Havana
prior to the occupation. However, during the U.S. occupation, the
military governor revoked the property rights of the plaintiff.184
The plaintiff brought suit for deprivation of property under the
ATS and a U.S. treaty with Spain, which made the U.S.
Constitution operative during Cuba’s occupation. Although the
court dismissed the plaintiff’s claim under the Platt
Amendment, the court implied that the plaintiff’s ATS claim fell
within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States since it
was under U.S. control at the time of the seizure.185 Moreover,
in Rasul v. Bush,186 the petitioner was a detainee in
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Rasul alleged an ATS claim, a federal
habeas petition, and a claim for violations of his due process
under the Administrative Procedures Act against the
government for their actions against him as a detainee.187
Although the plaintiff abandoned the ATS during the appeal
process,188 the court held that the plaintiff’s federal habeas
petition applied because the U.S. exercised “complete
jurisdiction and control” over Guantanamo Bay.189 The Rasul
precedent largely comport with the line of Supreme Court cases
applying domestic law to territories under the practical
sovereignty of the United States.190
Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 770.
O’Reilly De Camara, 209 U.S. at 45.
184 Id. at 49, 52.
185 See also Alex S. Moe, A Test by Any Other Name: The Influence of
Justice Breyer’s Concurrence in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 46 LOY.
U. CHI. L.J. 225, 238 (2014).
186 542 U.S. 466, 468 (2004)
187 Id. at 472.
188 Id. at 505 n.6.
189 Id. at 480.
190 De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1, 21 (1901); Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258
182
183
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Judicial decisions holding that military installations in Iraq
and Afghanistan are not under the de facto sovereignty of the
United States are incorrectly decided. In Al Maqeleh v. Gates,191
the court found it dispositive that the United States did not
deem the leasehold agreement between Afghanistan and the
United States to establish indicia of “permanence”.192 Judicial
decisions holding the permanence factor as dispositive in
determining practical sovereignty are at odds with the rationale
of the Boumediene decision and incorrectly emphasize formal,
rather than practical sovereignty considerations.193 The lease
agreement between the United States and Cuba at issue in
Boumediene and Rasul neither contains a provision exhibiting
an intention of permanence of U.S. forces nor does it contain a
provision providing for the ultimate sovereignty of the United
States. Significantly, it is not altogether uncommon for a
territory to be under the de jure sovereignty of one nation, while
under the plenary control, or practical sovereignty, of
another.”194
Additionally, the Al Maqaleh relies on Johnson v.
Eisentranger,195 to contend that “active theatres of war” preclude
U.S. 298 (1922) (extending “fundamental personal rights” to inhabitants of the
“unincorporated” U.S. territories, such as Puerto Rico, Guam and the
Philippines); Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138, (1904) (The United States
maintained complete sovereignty over these territories, and Congress governed
the territories); Rasul v. Myers, 563 F.3d 527, 532 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
191 Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 605. F.3d 84 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
192 Id. at 97. Other courts have reached similar conclusions based on the
Al Maqaleh precedent, see Ali v. Rumsfeld, 649 F.3d 762, 772 (D.C. Cir. 2011)
(finding it dispositive that like Bagram Air Force Base, the United States has
not established an intention of permanence in Iraq to warrant the exercise of
de facto sovereignty); Doe v. United States, 95 Fed. Cl. 546, 571 (2010) (citing
Al Maqaleh to hold that Iraq was not under the de facto sovereignty of the
United States).
193
See Rasul, 542 U.S. at 475 (ATS may apply where U.S. exercises
“plenary and exclusive jurisdiction,” but not “ultimate sovereignty”);
Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 764 (rejecting government’s “formalistic, sovereigntybased and nothing that objective factors and practical concerns color the de
facto sovereignty analysis); id. at 754 (relevant question is whether U.S.
exercises “dominion or power” in “the general, colloquial sense”); see also
Dawinder S. Sidhu, Shadowing the Flag: Extending the Habeas Writ Beyond
Guantanamo, at 56 (2011) (questioning the issue of permanence in AlMaqelah).
194 Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 754.
195 Johnson v. Eisentranger, 339 U.S. 763 (1950).

39

4 DAVID J SATNARINE(DO NOT DELETE)

200

PACE INT’L L. REV.

8/30/2016 3:53 PM

[Vol. 28:1

a finding of de facto sovereignty. However, a proper reading of
Eisentranger does not categorically preclude extraterritorial
application of U.S. law in military occupied territories. Instead,
Eisentranger holds that military occupation of foreign territory
does not mean that U.S. law “is wholly inapplicable in foreign
territories that we occupy and govern.”196 Significantly, the Al
Maqaleh court indicated that it would have decided differently
had it been aware that detainees were shuffled to active theatres
of war in order to evade domestic law.197 In the instant matter,
there is clear evidence that CIA officials transferred detainees
to Black Sites within Iraq and Afghanistan in order to avoid
application of domestic law. As will be discussed further below,
Company Y conspired with CIA officials to move detainees to
facilities where it was perceived that application of U.S. law
would not apply.
D. Detainees within the CIA’s Interrogation and Detention
Program in Cuba and Afghanistan are able to bring ATS
claims against Company Y because the enhanced
interrogation program occurred within de facto territories of
the United States
A number of detainees within the CIA’s Interrogation and
Detention program were held in territories exclusively under the
exercise and control of the United States, or in territories that
required acquiescence by the CIA headquarters officials.198
Additionally, the detainees were subject to inhumane acts of
torture by Company Y interrogators within de facto territories
of the United States because the U.S. government exercised

Id.; United States v. Siddiqui, 699 F.3d 690, 701 (2d Cir. 2012), as
amended (Nov. 15, 2012) (rejecting the argument that “active theatres of war”
generally preclude extraterritorial application of a U.S. statute . . .” it would
be incongruous to conclude that statutes aimed at protecting United States
officers and employees do not apply in areas of conflict where large numbers of
officers and employees operate”).
197 Al Maqaleh, 605 F.3d at 98.
198 While this analysis will not examine whether arrangements between
foreign sovereigns and the CIA required approval from CIA headquarters, it is
more than plausible that approval of territorial agreements between CIA
officials within the United States and host nations were required in order to
effectuate the Interrogation and Detention Program in locations outside of the
United States.
196
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“complete jurisdiction and control” over the territories Company
Y operated in.199 Unlike the Kiobel precedents, potential ATS
claims arising from detainees subject to Company Y’s
interrogation techniques within Iraq and Afghanistan arose
during a time and under a legal regime in which there was
effectively no operative law other than that of the United States.
This factor significantly undermines the fundamental premise
for the presumption against extraterritorial application of the
ATS and removes any conflicts with foreign law. Notably, the
fundamental lesson of Rasul holing is that there can be no
prisons beyond the law.
Beginning in 2003, the CIA held a number of detainees
within the vicinity of military installations in Guantanamo Bay,
Cuba.200 After detaining at least 113 individuals through 2004,
the CIA brought only six additional detainees into its custody:
four in 2005, one in 2006, and one in 2007. By March 2006, the
interrogation program was operating in only one country. The
CIA last used its enhanced interrogation techniques on
November 8, 2007. The CIA did not hold any detainees after
April 2008.201 In 2004, the Department of Justice voiced
concerns that the pending Supreme Court decision in Rasul v.
Bush may allow the detainees to raise federal habeas petitions.
In response to these concerns, the CIA transferred all
Guantanamo Bay detainees to other detention facilities.202
These actions indicate that the CIA sought to transfer detainees
from the de facto sovereignty of the United States to other
detention beyond the reach of U.S. law.203
During the operational period of Company Y’s enhanced
interrogation techniques, the United States maintained de facto
sovereignty over Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. According to the SSCI
Report, Detention Site Red was presumably located in
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba – during the period that Company Y
was operating as the sole source of interrogators for the CIA. 204
Rasul, 542 U.S. at 480.
SSCI Report, supra note 16 at 140.
201 SSCI Report, supra note 16 Findings and Conclusions at 16.
202 Id. at 141,151.
203 See Boumedienne, 553 U.S. at 755; Al Maqaleh, 605. F.3d at 98.
204 Amnesty Int’l Report, supra note 14, at 24; SSCI Report, supra note
14, at Executive Summary p. 140 n.848.
199
200
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Detainees who were subject to Company Y’s enhanced
interrogation techniques at Detention Site Red were within a de
facto territory of the United States at that time.205
CIA detention sites in Afghanistan206 were under the
practical sovereignty of the United States during Company Y’s
operational period. The SSCI Report identifies Detention Site
Orange and Detention Site Brown as facilities operated within
Afghanistan during the period that Company Y also operated as
the sole source contract for enhanced interrogation
techniques.207 Detention Sites Orange and Brown were also
operational through 2006 Company Y’s sole source contract.208
Additionally, a number of reports have linked Detention Sites
Brown and Orange to U.S. military installations at Bagram Air
Base, Afghanistan.209 During this period, the United States held
SSCI Report, supra note 16, Findings and Conclusions at 16, SSIC
Report at 140; O’Reilly De Camara, 209 U.S. at 50 (noting that the ATS applied
to extraterritorial conduct because of a treaty between the U.S. and Spain that
made U.S. law operative in Cuba during a U.S. occupation of the country);
Fleming v. Page, 50 U.S. 603, 614 (1850) (finding that the United States
exercised dominion and control over the Port of Tampico, Mexico where “the
country was in the exclusive and firm possession of the United States, and
governed by its military authorities, acting under the orders of the President”);
Rasul, 542 U.S. at 468 (holding that the ATS may apply to actions in
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba because the United States maintained complete
jurisdiction and control over the territory as demonstrated by an express lease
agreement).
206
Human Rights Watch, Lithuania: Reopen Investigation into Secret
CIA Prisons, June 25, 2013, http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/06/25/lithuaniareopen-investigation-secret-cia-prisons%20; VICE NEWS, CIA Held Detainees at
Lithuania
Black
Site,
Investigators
Claim,
Jan.
16,
2015,
https://news.vice.com/article/cia-held-detainees-at-lithuania-black-siteinvestigators-claim; Diana Priest, CIA Holds Terror Suspects in Secret Prisons,
WASH.
POST,
Nov
2,
2005,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2005/11/01/AR2005110101644_pf.html
207 Amnesty Int’l Report, supra note 16, at 24.
208 Id. at 50; SSCI Report, supra note 16, at Executive Summary p. 96.
209 Amy Goodman, “Worse” Than Guantanamo: U.S. Expands Secretive
Prison Inside Bagram Air Base in Afghanistan, DEMOCRACY NOW, Feb. 27,
2006,
http://www.democracynow.org/2006/2/27/worse_than_guantanamo_u_s_expan
ds; Tim Golden and Eric Schmitt, A Growing Afghan Prison Rivals Bleak
Guantanamo, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/26/
international/26bagram.html? pagewanted=all; Marc Ambinder, Inside the
Secret Interrogation Facility at Bagram, THE ATLANTIC, May 14, 2010,
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2010/05/inside-the-secretinterrogation-facility-at-bagra m/56678/; Alissa Rubin, Afghans Detail
205
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virtually complete control of Bagram Air Force Base
Afghanistan.210 Moreover, detainees were transferred to this
location for the sole purpose of evading the reach of U.S.
domestic law.211 In each of these facilities, the U.S. maintained
de facto sovereignty due to the nature of its control over the
territories.
CONCLUSION
This in-depth analysis has articulated fully the legal
theories and obstacles governing Company Y’s legal liability
under the Alien Tort Statute. Company Y operated in de facto
territories of the United States when conducting enhanced
interrogation techniques. Additionally, since corporate liability
is a remedy under the Alien Tort Statute, Company Y may be
held liable for its tortious interrogation tactics conducted on
detainees within the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation
program.

Detention in “Black Jail” at U.S. Base, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 2009,
http://www.nytimes.com/
2009/11/29/world/asia/29bagram.html?pagewanted=all.
210 Fleming v. Page, 50 U.S. 603, 614 (1850) (finding that the United
States exercised dominion and control over the Port of Tampico, Mexico where
“the country was in the exclusive and firm possession of the United States, and
governed by its military authorities, acting under the orders of the President”);
see also Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 390 U.S. App. D.C. 352, 605 F.3d 84 (2010); See
also, Wahid v. Gates, 876 F. Supp. 2d 15, 20 (D.D.C. 2012) (analyzing then
Deputy Secretary of Defense for Detainee Policy statements regarding the
intent of the U.S. to maintain control over Bagram indefinitely and finding
that the U.S. maintained control over Bagram currently, but there is no
conclusive evidence that it intended to do so indefinitely).

211
Al Maqaleh, 605 F.3d at 98 (purposeful movement of detainees to
evade the reach of domestic law is a relevant factor in determining whether
practical sovereignty exists).
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